This study investigates the eects of national culture on ®rms' design of and employees' preference for management controls. Data for testing two hypotheses are collected from 159 Taiwanese managers working in six each of Japanese-, Taiwanese-, and U.S.-owned, size-matched, computers/electronics ®rms in Taiwan. Overall, the results are consistent with national culture aecting these ®rms' design of and employees' preference for seven management controls, though there also are anomalies. These ®ndings are combined with prior research for identifying desirable improvements in research design and method, variable measurement and selection, and, most important, the theoretical foundation for culture-based research on management controls. #
Management control systems (MCSs) help organizations to increase the probability that employees make decisions and take actions which are in the organizations' best interest. Prior research on the determinants of MCS design has reported that MCSs are contingent on technology, competition, environmental uncertainty, and organizational size (Otley & Wilkinson, 1988; Fisher, 1995) . Extant research also has reported that organizational structures are contingent on these variables (Hall, 1987; Lincoln & Kalleberg, 1990) . However, while similarities exist across countries in the relationship between organizational context (e.g. technology, size, uncertainty) and organizational design (e.g. formalization, standardization, decentralization), considerable variation remains across countries which these contingency variables do not explain (Child, 1981; Lincoln & Kalleberg, 1990) . In addition, extant research on the preferences for and design of MCSs has reported cross-national dierences. (Examples of such research will be presented later.) Together, these latter ®ndings are consistent with the existence of nation-speci®c factors which aect the design of and preference for controls within a country.
The purpose of this study is to advance understanding of how national culture aects preferences for and the design of MCSs. This is an important topic in the current era of global operations, as companies increasingly need to know whether management controls that are eective in one national setting will have alternate levels of eectiveness if used in a dierent national setting. A number of prior studies have investigated this issue (Birnberg & Snodgrass, 1988; Harrison, 1992 Harrison, , 1993 Ueno & Wu, 1993; Chow et al., 1994 Chow et al., , 1996 Harrison et al., 1994; Merchant et al., 1995; O'Connor, 1995) . While some support has been found for the predicted eects of national culture on MCS preference and design, the results of many tests have been either nonsigni®cant, or signi®cant but either the sign of the mean dierence or the form of the detected interaction was opposite to prediction.
An important cause of these mixed within-study results may be ineective control for the eects of contingency variables. For example, many prior studies have used samples of managers who work for ®rms in dierent countries. But there can be great variation in such ®rms' technology, uncertainty and size, which could drive or confound the test results. In addition, ®rms that operate in dierent national settings may be subject to dierent laws, regulations and local competitive factors (e.g. labor supply) which can impact their MCS design. Thus, while it seems appropriate to test for the eects of national culture on MCSs by comparing samples from dierent national cultures, not controlling for other factors, such as ®rm size and industry, can signi®cantly reduce the reliability of the results.
A consideration in the design of the current study was to preserve comparability to prior studies in order to facilitate an integrative evaluation of these studies. Thus, we retained Hofstede's taxonomy of national cultureÐwhich all of the prior related studies (except Birnberg & Snodgrass, 1988 ) had used Ðas the basis for deriving predictions. To control for the eects of other contingency variables, data are collected from managers of a common ethnicity (Chinese) who are employed by 18 ®rms from the same geographic location (a high-tech industrial park outside Taipei) and industry (electronics and/or computers). Six each of these ®rms are Japanese-, U.S.-, and Taiwanese-owned, and they are matched on size across national ownership. Inferences about the importance of national culture are drawn based on comparing the Japanese-and U. S. -owned ®rms' controls in their Taiwanese operations against those of the local Taiwanese-owned ®rms.
The remainder of this paper is organized into ®ve sections. The ®rst section provides a review of prior research on national culture and management control and then develops predictions about Japanese-, US -and Taiwanese-owned ®rms' MCSs in their home-country and Taiwanese operations. The second section develops two hypotheses and analyzes issues related to the design of the empirical study. The third and fourth sections describe the empirical method and results. The ®nal section discusses the empirical results and provides suggestions for future research.
Literature review
This section provides a brief review of theoretical taxonomies of work-related national culture. Then it reviews cross-national studies which have tested predictions based on Hofstede's (1980 Hofstede's ( , 1991 taxonomy concerning either MCS preference or design, or the eects of a national culture-by-management control interaction. Next, Hofstede's taxonomy is used to develop predictions about the design of and preference for seven management controls in Japanese-and US-owned ®rms' home-country operations as well as the controls they and Taiwanese-owned ®rms use in their Taiwanese operations. Predicted Japan±US home-country dierences are compared to extant research ®ndings to shed further light on the ecacy of Hofstede's taxonomy and to provide a basis for inferring culture-driven changes that Japanese and U. S. ®rms need to make to their domestic MCSs for transfer to their Taiwanese operations. (Only minimal comparative ®ndings for Taiwan are available.)
Theoretical taxonomies of national culture
Several taxonomies exist that identify and operationalize components of national culture (Hellriegel et al., 1992; Smith, 1992; Adler, 1996; Hodgetts & Luthans, 1997) . The initial appearance of these taxonomies spans a considerable time period, with two recent additions being those of Schwartz (1994) and Trompenaars (1994) . Schwartz (1994) has 10 national culture typesÐ Achievement, Benevolence, Conformity, Hedonism, Power, Security, Self-Direction, Stimulation, Tradition, and UniversalismÐwhich have a two-dimensional structureÐOpenness to change vs conservatism, and self-enhancement vs self-transcendence.
1 Trompenaars (1994) has seven cultural orientations. Five of these are based on how people relate to each other: Universalism vs Particularism, Individualism vs Collectivism, Neutral vs Emotional, Speci®c vs Diuse, and Achievement vs Ascription. The remaining two orientations are people's attitudes toward time and the environment. Extending Trompenaars' work, Smith et al. (1996) using a sample of 8,841 workers in 43 countries identi®ed a three-dimensional model with two primary dimensions (achievement± ascription, individualism±collectivism). Because of their recency, these new taxonomies have not been extensively validated, nor have they been used in MCS research. Also, theoretical linkages between their national culture constructs and management controls have yet to be developed.
In contrast, Hofstede's (1980 Hofstede's ( , 1991 taxonomy has been extensively validated (Chinese Cultural Connection, 1987; Bochner, 1994; Sùndergaard, 1994; Smith et al., 1996) and widely used in prior MCS research (Soeters & Schreuder, 1988; Chow et al., 1991; Harrison, 1992 Harrison, , 1993 Ueno & Wu, 1993; Harrison et al., 1994; Merchant et al., 1995; O'Connor, 1995) . Consequently, we rely on Hofstede's framework to increase comparability of our results to those of prior research.
Hofstede's taxonomy has ®ve dimensions: individualism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, and Confucian dynamism.
2 For the three countries examined in the current study, Hofstede (1980 Hofstede ( , 1991 has reported the following cultural scores, along with summary statistics for a large number of countries from around the world: Japan Taiwan U.S. Mean Range SD  Individualism  46  17  91  51  2±91 25  Power distance  54  58  40  51 11±94 20  Uncertainty  avoidance  92  69  46  64 8±112 24  Masculinity  95  45  62  51  5±95 20  Confucian  dynamism  80  87  29  46 0±118 29 Some of these dimensions have been shown to be empirically related to constructs in other national culture taxonomies.
3 Hofstede (1980 Hofstede ( , 1983 Hofstede ( , 1984 Hofstede ( , 1991 has suggested speci®c predictions of each of his cultural dimensions for preferences or practices related to controls. Further below, we will use Japan, Taiwan and U.S. scores on each dimension to derive predictions of how their home-country MCS designs would dier if national culture is an important determinant of the design of and preference for MCSs and, by inference, the needed changes in Japanese and U.S. ®rms' home-country MCSs for conformance to Taiwanese culture-based preferences. To gain some insights into the applications and applicability of Hofstede's taxonomy and to provide an empirical basis for our crosscultural predictions, ®rst consider the summaries in Table 1 of nine prior studies based on Hofstede's cultural dimensions. The dependent variables in these studies range from preferences for controls (e.g. selection of controllability ®lters in Chow et al. (1994) ), to the design of controls [e.g. control system tightness in Chow et al. (1996) and team rewards in Merchant et al. (1995) ], to the eects of controls [e.g. performance in Chow et al. (1991) and job tension and satisfaction in Harrison 3 Importantly for the present study, Hofstede's framework has been validated from an Asian perspective by the Chinese Cultural Connection (1987). They used Asian literature to develop an a priori cultural model and then tested it with data from Asian and Western countries. Importantly for our study, there was a high level of correlation between their and Hofstede's models. In addition, Hofstede's individualism and power distance are associated with Smith et al.'s (1996) achievement and with Schwartz's (1994) openness to change/ conservatism. Several other studies also have a replicated Hofstede's framework using a variety of samples during the 1980s and 1990s (Sùndergaard, 1994) . 1 These two dimensions are aspects of individualism (Schwartz, 1992; Ralston et al., 1996) .
2 Individualism relates to individuals' emphasis on self interest vs the interests of the group. Power Distance is the extent to which the members of a society accept that power in institutions and organizations is vertically distributed unequally. Uncertainity Avoidance is the degree to which members of a society feel uncomfortable with uncertainity and ambiguity. Masculinity is the preference for achievement, heroism, assertiveness and material success, as opposed to an emphasis on interpersonal relationships, modesty, caring for the weak, and the quality of life. Confucian Dynamism relates to long-vs short-term orientation. Table 1 Descriptions of prior studies which are based on Hofstede (1980 Hofstede ( , 1991 Harrison et al. (1994 Harrison et al. ( , 1994 posited and found that the use of long-term planning is related to Confucian dynamism and individualism, while Ueno and Wu (1993) predicted, though they did not ®nd, that use of long-range budgets increased with uncertainty avoidance.
Factors limiting the reliability and comparability of the prior studies' ®ndings also need to be noted. First is that they are subject to the potential in¯uences of non-controlled contingency variables. For example, while both Chow et al. (1996) and Merchant et al. (1995) compared ®rms matched on industry and size, the samples were located in dierent countries, and the data from each country were collected several years apart. Second, the industries sampled have varied across studies. For example, while most of the other studies had examined manufacturing ®rms, Harrison's (1992 Harrison's ( , 1993 data were collected from the merchandising sector. And even though O'Connor (1995) controlled for local conditions by using ®rms operating in the same national setting (Singapore), they were from a broad range of manufacturing industries and sizes.
In addition, these studies had collected data from divergent sources. For example, Chow et al. (1996) focused on pro®t center managers, O'Connor (1995) used mid-level manufacturing managers, the sample in Harrison et al. (1994) was senior accounting and ®nance executives, and Chow et al. (1991 Chow et al. ( , 1994 used student subjects.
These diverse subject groups are likely to have dierent experiences and employment contexts and, given the results of contingency-theory research, it is reasonable to expect that they also would face, or prefer, dierent controls. This may be why, for example, even though Chow et al. (1991 Chow et al. ( , 1994 had both focused on the relation between individualism and team-based pay, the former obtained a non-signi®cant result, while the latter had a signi®cant result which was opposite in form to that predicted.
In total, considering the range of unresolved issues in the prior studies, their ®ndings, both individually and in aggregate, are insucient for reliable conclusions about the importance of national cultureÐas operationalized using Hofstede's taxonomyÐin the design of and preference for individual management controls and especially for a set of controls. As will be discussed later, many aspects of the current study are aimed at reducing limitations of the prior research.
National culture and predicted dierences in home-country use of controls
Our study focused on seven controls, most of which have been extensively studied in uninational contexts (Otley & Wilkinson, 1988; Merchant, 1989; Birnberg et al., 1990; Fisher, 1995; Young & Lewis, 1995) . Together, they provide relatively complete coverage of the major control functions, including organizing, planning, evaluating, and rewarding (Otley, 1980; Flamholtz et al., 1985; Birnberg & Snodgrass, 1988) . The advantage of considering a large number of controls is that it enables a comprehensive evaluation of culture's eects. However, it also has a disadvantage in that for some of the controls it is not possible to develop unambiguous directional predictions without making some assumptions about the relative importance of dierent cultural dimensions. This issue is further elaborated on in the ensuing analysis.
Below, Hofstede's taxonomy is ®rst used to derive directional predictions about dierences in Japanese, Taiwanese and U.S. home-country preference for and design of the seven controls. These predictions are presented in Table 2 and compared to prior between country comparisons for two purposes: (1) to shed further light on the applicability of Hofstede's cultural taxonomy; and (2) to provide a benchmark for comparing Japanese and U.S. ®rms' MCSs in Taiwan.
The predictions in Table 2 are predicated on national culture being an important determinant of the preferences for and design of alternate controls. For each control, column two lists the relevant cultural dimension(s). The third column presents the implication of each operant cultural dimension for the control. Column four combines these implications across cultural dimensions to yield an overall prediction of how Japanese, Taiwanese and U. S. home-country practices would dier. The table also contains relevant prior ®ndings in columns ®ve and six. 4 An important note about the predictions is that the cultural dimensions are not expected to be equally important to predicting national culture± management control relationships, particularly for the three countries investigated. First, Hofstede (1980 Hofstede ( , 1991 has cautioned that uncertainty avoidance may be more relevant to describing Western than Oriental cultures while Confucian dynamism may be more applicable to Asian cultures. The evidence to date also indicates that individualism is the most important dimension of national culture, especially when contrasting Western and Oriental culture (Triandis, 1995; Smith et al., 1996) . Second, Japan, Taiwan and the U.S. have varying degrees of divergence across the cultural dimensions and the extent to which countries differ on a relevant cultural dimension should aect the degree to which they vary on the related management control. Based on the distribution of national scores, Hofstede (1980 Hofstede ( , 1991 has suggested that only dierences of 20 or more on a cultural dimension can be considered to be material. For Japan, Taiwan and the U.S., all pairwise dierences on individualism and uncertainty avoidance are greater than 20, while even the largest between-nation dierence on power distance (Taiwan vs U.S.) is only 18. For masculinity, all pairwise dierences are greater than 20 except that between the U.S. and Taiwan. Finally, for Confucian dynamism, all pairwise dierences are greater than 20 except between Japan and Taiwan.
Third, Harrison (1992) and Harrison et al. (1994) have noted that most countries' individualism and power distance scores are negatively associated: countries that are high on one tend to be low on the other. Given this highly signi®cant negative correlation between them, the eects of either cultural dimension on controls would have to be considered in conjunction with those of the other.
Based on the preceding considerations, we assume that for the three nations in this study, when multiple national-cultural dimensions are potentially operative and directional predictions based on them individually con¯ict, individualism has the largest eect on the design of and preference for management controls, masculinity has the next largest eect, with power distance, Confucian Dynamism and uncertainty avoidance having lesser eects.
Organizing
Decentralization is the extent to which decision making responsibility is delegated to lower levels in a vertical hierarchy. Hofstede (1980 Hofstede ( , 1983 Hofstede ( , 1984 Hofstede ( , 1991 suggests that because power distance relates to the acceptance of vertical power inequality among people, the preference for decentralization is negatively related to it. On the other hand, preference for this control can be expected to increase with individualism because people from individualistic cultures would prefer to have more control over their own actions. Based on our assumption about the relative importance of these two dimensions to the three countries in our sample, U.S. ®rms' home-country MCSs are predicted to have more decentralization than those of the Japanese ®rms, while the Taiwanese ®rms' MCSs would have the least.
Structuring of activities refers to the existence of written policies, rules, standardized procedures, and manuals which specify how to and, sometimes how not to, perform activities (Rockness & Shields, 1984; Merchant, 1985) . Hofstede (1980 Hofstede ( , 1983 Hofstede ( , 1984 Hofstede ( , 1991 suggests that people higher in uncertainty avoidance are less comfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity, and prefer to cope with them by relying on rules of behavior, structuring of activities, and standardization of procedures. Power distance and individualism also are potentially relevant. People low (high) on individualism (power distance) would prefer, or at least accept, having less control over their own workrelated actions. Based on our assumption about the relative importance of these three cultural dimensions, we predict that structuring of activities will be highest in the Taiwanese ®rms, lowest in the U.S. ®rms, with the Japanese ®rms being in the middle.
Planning
Participative budgeting refers to the extent to which subordinates have input into the development and selection of the performance plan which their superiors will hold them responsible for achieving (Shields & Young, 1993) . Hofstede (1984) posits that low power distance implies a preference for more equality in vertical relationships. In low power distance cultures, because of this vertical equality, employees prefer or expect to be involved with, or have input into, their organization's decision making process, including determining their budgets. In contrast, in high power distance cultures, since superiors are expec-ted to unilaterally make decisions about subordinates, less use of participative budgeting would be expected. Individualism also is relevant, as people higher on this cultural dimension prefer to have more in¯uence over their own actions. 5 The power distance±individualism combinations of the three countries support the prediction that participative budgeting would be highest (lowest) within U.S. (Taiwanese) ®rms, with Japanese ®rms being in between.
Standard tightness refers to the ex ante probability that an employee can attain his or her performance plan (Chow, 1983; Merchant & Manzoni, 1989) . The preference for standard tightness is subject to the in¯uences of two cultural dimensions. People with higher uncertainty avoidance prefer looser standards since they are more likely to be achieved. Higher masculinity, however, implies the opposite, as tighter standards are more challenging. Using our assumption about the relative importance of these two dimensions, we predict that Japanese ®rms would use the tightest standards in their home country, U.S. ®rms would be next, and Taiwanese ®rms would have the loosest standards.
Evaluating and rewarding
Participative performance evaluation refers to the extent to which employees have input into the evaluation of their own performance (Briers & Hirst, 1990) . Hofstede (1980 Hofstede ( , 1983 Hofstede ( , 1984 Hofstede ( , 1991 suggests that the preference for this control is negatively related to power distance because individuals in a lower power-distance culture are less willing to passively accept superiors' evaluations. And as with participative budgeting, people higher on individualism can be expected to prefer having more in¯uence on how their performance is evaluated. The three countries' power distance±indivi-dualism combinations lead to the prediction that U.S. ®rms would have the highest level of participative performance evaluation, followed by Japanese ®rms, with Taiwanese ®rms having the lowest level.
Controllability ®lters reduce the degree to which employees' performance evaluations are subject to factors beyond their control (Demski, 1976; Merchant, 1989) . In Hofstede's framework, higher uncertainty avoidance implies a greater preference for being insulated from uncertainty and its eects. However, individualism also is potentially relevant, as people high on this cultural dimension are more desirous of being accountable for their personal actions. The three countries' uncertainty avoidance scores imply that Japanese (U.S.) ®rms would have the highest (lowest) use of controllability ®lters, with Taiwanese ®rms being in between. Their individualism scores, however, imply that U.S. ®rms would have the highest, Japanese ®rms the second highest, and Taiwanese ®rms the lowest, use of controllability ®lters. This latter prediction is assumed to dominate given uncertainty avoidance's potential lack of universal applicability and the presumed greater in¯uence of the individualism dimension.
Performance-contingent ®nancial rewards relate to the extent that ®nancial compensation is determined by comparing budgeted to actual performance (Demski & Feltham, 1978; Waller & Chow, 1985) . Preference for this control potentially is subject to the con¯icting in¯uences of three cultural dimensions. First, a greater preference for performance-contingent rewards is expected for a culture higher in masculinity. However, such rewards also tend to introduce or accentuate pay dierences across co-workers, which is contrary to low-individualism cultures' preferences for relatively equal pay and avoidance of interpersonal comparisons and con¯ict (Bond et al., 1982) . Uncertainty 5 We are indebted to a reviewer for reminding us that participative budgeting has both involvement and in¯uence aspects. As can be seen from how we measure this variable, our focus is the in¯uence aspect. We reason that preference for in¯uence on the budget would increase with individualism, as higher individualism implies a preference for controlling one's own destiny. We also expect the preference for in¯uence to decrease with power distance, as this cultural dimension relates to the acceptance of directives from superiors. It is of interest to note that our directional prediction on the eect of individualism is opposite to that of Harrison (1992) , who argued for a negative relation between it and the preference for participative budgeting. This divergence can be explained by his focus on the involvement aspect of participative budgeting, where lower individualism would imply a stronger belief in group decisions (thus involvement of individuals in the budgeting process). Given our focus on in¯uence, the three nations' combinations of individualism and power distance scores produce mutually supporting predictions that U.S. ®rms would have the highest degree of participative budgeting in their home-country, followed by the Japanese ®rms, with Taiwanese ®rms being lowest. avoidance also may be relevant. Since performancecontingent rewards increase the variance of the total compensation, preference for them can be expected to decrease with uncertainty avoidance. Based on our assumption about the relative importance of these three cultural dimensions, we predict that the U.S. (Taiwanese) ®rms would have the highest (lowest) performance contingent rewards, with Japanese ®rms in the middle.
In summary, while Hofstede's taxonomy of national culture can be used to derive three-country directional predictions for all seven controls, predictions for structuring of activities, standard tightness, performance-contingent rewards, and controllability ®lters are possible only by making assumptions about the relative impacts of the various cultural dimension(s) and/or are limited by lack of signi®cant divergence in the relevant national culture scores across the three countries.
Comparison of predictions to prior comparative ®ndings
A comparison of columns four and six in Table  2 shows that for these seven controls, the predictions for decentralization, participative budgeting, performance-contingent rewards and controllability ®lters are consistent with the majority of the available evidence. The predictions are inconsistent with the ®ndings of prior studies for structuring of activities and standard tightness, while there is a lack of prior evidence on participative performance evaluation. Thus, out of six controls for which prior empirical evidence is available, the predictions are consistent with the evidence on four controls and inconsistent for two controls.
Taken together, the mixed ®ndings summarized in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that national culture may only be important to the design of and preference for some, but not all, of the seven controls. Another possibility is that Hofstede's taxonomy has not adequately uncovered the underlying cultural dimensions for application to the level of speci®c controls and/or that the dimensions have not been tightly enough de®ned to guide consistent applications. This possibility is manifest in the challenges in deriving directional predictions for each control, and in the variance across prior studies' use of Hofstede's dimensions in generating predictions. Yet another possibility is that the prior results are confounded by dierent characteristics of samples taken from dierent national origins and local environmental conditions. Since the extant studies lack comparability across multiple controls (and whether their focus is design, preference or eects) and/or samples (nations, industries, subjects), they cannot simply be compared or aggregated for dierentiating among these potential explanations.
Hypotheses and research design
Assuming that national culture is an important determinant of the design of and preference for management controls, the preceding discussion and review provide the basis for stating two hypotheses. The ®rst hypothesis is that ®rms operating in countries with cultures dierent from their home-countries would modify their homecountry MCSs so that the controls they use in the latter would not dier from those of locally-owned ®rms:
H1: The controls used by ®rms operating in the same foreign country would not dier from each other or those of the locally-owned ®rms.
The second hypothesis deals with the similarity of MCS design and foreign employees' MCS preferences. In addition to modifying their home-country controls, ®rms also can increase their foreign employees`acceptance of such controls by altering their preferences. One way to attain this outcome is to engage in socialization (e.g. recruitment, selection, indoctrination, training, mentoring, career ladders, and reward systems) (Van Maanen & Schein, 1979; Pascale, 1985; Chatman, 1989) . A ®rm could hire local employees who have predispositions toward their home-country national culture (e.g. because of having studied and/or worked there). Alternatively or in addition, a ®rm could de-emphasize its reliance on administrative controls such as those embodied in a formal MCS. Instead, it could put more emphasis on socializing its foreign employees to its homecountry national and organizational culture, as some U.S. electronics ®rms reportedly have done in managing their foreign subsidiaries (Jaeger, 1983) . If ®rms emphasize this hiring and socialization approach, then their MCSs in a foreign country can dier from those of locally-owned ®rms, yet the similarity between their MCSs and local employees' preferences still would not dier from that of locallyowned ®rms. Thus: H2: The similarity between local employees' preferred MCS and the design of the MCS would not dier between foreign and locallyowned ®rms.
Testing the two stated hypotheses required using ®rms from at least two national origins, and comparing both their home-country and crossborder use of controls because either comparison alone is subject to the eects of omitted variables. In the case of Japanese-and US-owned ®rms, if the former's home-country controls were simply compared to those that they used in the US, any dierences found could be due to the eects of local conditions. U.S. ®rms' home-country practices would provide a control for such variables. Because data were not available for comparing the MCSs that ®rms from Japan and the U.S. use domestically as well as in each other's country, we elected to compare their controls in a common third location: Taiwan. In conducting this comparison, we were denied the opportunity to measure the Japanese and U.S. sample ®rms' homecountry MCSs, and had to rely on the prior ®nd-ings reported in Table 2 to infer where these differed. This lack of home-country ®ndings for the sample ®rms weakened our ability to derive reliable inferences. For example, if the Japanese and U.S. sample ®rms' controls are similar in Taiwan, this can be due to their being similar in their home-countries, rather than to modi®cations to be consistent with Taiwanese national culture. Alternately, such a ®nding could re¯ect both the Japanese and U.S. ®rms having modi®ed their controls for use in Taiwan, but in a direction opposite to that of their local employees' culture-based preferences. Our inclusion of a set of Taiwaneseowned ®rms was an attempt to reduce this limitation by providing a locally-based benchmark.
To attempt to control for the eects of environmental uncertainty, technology, and ®rm size, the sample ®rms were matched on industry (electronics and/or computers) and size (sales and number of employees). All of the Japanese-and U.S.-owned ®rms in the sample only had manufacturing operations in Taiwan. But because they were all large, the only available size matches for them among Taiwanese-owned ®rms were ones which included both corporate headquarters and manufacturing operations. To control for this dierence, the top-level headquarters managers of the Taiwanese-owned ®rms were excluded from the sample.
Another consideration in the research design is that some controls operate at the interface between a ®rm and its environment. For example, many accounting methods are required for use by regulatory agencies (e.g. tax regulations can stipulate transfer pricing methods, securities markets can drive how performance is measured), while others are much more internally focused (e.g. participative budgeting). An important consideration in the choice of controls to include in this study was that management had freedom to choose their particular levels.
Empirical method
This section contains two parts. First is a further description of the sample used to test the hypotheses. The second part describes the survey instrument and dependent variables.
Sample
The sample was comprised of the top two levels of Taiwanese managers working in six each of Japanese-, Taiwanese, and U.S-owned ®rms. All of these ®rms were among the largest electronics and/or computer ®rms with manufacturing facilities in Taiwan, and all were located in an industrial park in a Taipei suburb. The sample ®rms had the following average numbers of employees and annual sales (in New Taiwanese Dollars (NT$), approximately equal to U.S.$0.04 each): Japanese ®rms: 1904, NT$4,327,666,667; Taiwanese ®rms: 2184, NT$4,548,666,667; and U.S. ®rms: 1964, NT$4,043,000,000. There was no signi®cant dierence across national origins in either size measure, as tested by Kruskal±Wallis one-way ANOVA (both X 2 <1.0, p>0.60). Within each ®rm, a member of top management distributed the survey instrument using the ®rm's internal mail system. (Each anonymous response was returned directly to the research team.) This contact person selected the managers to receive the questionnaire, subject to the requirement that the recipient be in the top two levels of Taiwanese managers. A total of 391 questionnaires were distributed and 206 responses (53%) were received. Of these, 159 provided complete information for constructing the variables for statistical analysis. All 159 respondents were of Chinese ethnicity. They had worked for their ®rms for a mean of 10.7 years (S.D.=6.9) and had been in their current positions for an average of 3.6 years (S.D.=2.9). On average, they were responsible for 174 employees (S.D.=274) and had an annual cost budget of NT$558,678,082 (S.D.=NT$1,166,230,591).
Instrument and dependent variables
The survey instrument was developed using a two-stage process. In the ®rst stage, the entireresearch team visited the Taiwanese headquarters of four electronics and/or computer ®rms operating in Taiwan. Two were Taiwanese-owned, and one each was a Japanese and a US subsidiary. Each visit included interviews with members of top management, line managers and managers from the accounting and ®nance functions. These interviews provided an understanding of the operations and control systems in the Taiwanese electronics and/or computer industry to ensure that the management controls selected for study were applicable in this setting. They also identi®ed variables that the Taiwanese managers considered too sensitive for inclusion in the survey. In the second stage, information gained from the interviews was combined with related prior research to develop the survey instrument in English. Then it was translated into Chinese for administration. Following Brislin's (1980) prescription for research involving dierent languages, the Chinese version was ®rst prepared by a person who had not developed the English original. Then it was independently back-translated into English, and dierences from the English original were noted and resolved.
Measures for the seven controls (see Appendix) were adapted from prior research to the extent possible. The design of each control was measured by having each respondent rate his or her perception of its current level. 7 The response format for each item was a seven-point scale anchored by 1=Extremely Low and 7=Extremely High. We also asked each respondent to indicate his or her most preferred level of each control, using the same response format as for the MCS design variable. Subtracting the preferred level from the design level yielded the measure of design-preference similarity.
The measures of decentralization and structuring of activities were based on those developed by Khandwalla (1977) , Pugh et al. (1968) , Pugh (1969) and Gordon and Narayanan (1984) . Minor modi®cations were made to ®t the context of this study. Participative budgeting was measured with questions adapted from Brownell (1982) , Brownell (1985) , Kenis (1979) , Merchant (1981) , Milani (1975) , and Shields and Young (1993) . The standard tightness measure was adapted from Kenis (1979) , Simons (1988) , and Merchant and Manzoni (1989) .
Since no established measure existed for participative performance evaluation, we developed one patterned after the participative budgeting measure. An established measure for controllability 6 One topic that the Taiwanese managers refused to discuss was the compensation and promotion/demotion system. As an example of their sensitivity to this topic, we asked several managers how many times they had been promoted or granted bonuses in the past 3 years. None was willing to answer this question. This experience led us to conclude that both the willingness of companies to participate and the response rate would be severely reduced if we were to include questions on compensation.
7 Strictly speaking we have measured the respondents' perceptions of their ®rms' realized MCS design which may dier from their ®rms' intended design. We assume that since these managers typically had worked for their employer for many years, their perception of the controls would be highly correlated with the actual controls, assuming these controls exist independent of perception.
®lters also was unavailable, and we developed one based on the framework and ®ndings of Merchant (1989) . Merchant's literature review and ®eld study identi®ed ®ve types of situations in which ®rms have policies for risk exposure, and we developed a question for each type. Finally, the measure of performance-contingent ®nancial rewards was based on the measures used by Shields and Young (1993) and Simons (1988) .
Results
This section is divided into three parts. The ®rst part reports descriptive statistics for MCS design and design-preference similarity. The last two parts report inferential statistics for each dependent variable with respect to the hypotheses. Table 3 reports the means, standard deviations, and Cronbach alphas for the design levels of the seven controls classi®ed by national ownership. Table 4 presents these statistics for the designpreference similarity measures. All of the variables' measures had an acceptable level of reliability since each Cronbach alpha was greater than 0.60 (range: 0.63±0.93). Tables 3 and 4 indicated that dispersion exists both within nations across controls, and across nations for a control. For example, in Table 3 , the design level of structuring of activities ranged from a low of 63.61 for the Japanese ®rms to a high of 73.47 for the U.S. ®rms, and participative budgeting ranged from 18.32 for the Japanese ®rms to 21.66 for the Taiwanese ®rms. In Table 4 , design-preference similarity for the Taiwanese ®rm employees ranged from À0.92 for standard tightness to À12.46 for structuring of activities, and, across nations, participative budgeting ranged from À1.39 for the Taiwanese ®rms to À3.63 for the Japanese ®rms. Also note that all of the means in Table 4 were negative, indicating that the Taiwanese managers preferred more of each control than they perceived to be present.
Descriptive statistics

Inspection of
MCS Design
A four-part analysis was used to test H1. First, a 3Â6Â7 MANOVA was performed to test whether the seven controls varied among the ®rms with Japanese, Taiwanese, or U.S. ownership (see upper left quadrant in Table 5 ). National ownership was a ®xed-eect, three level, between-subjects variable, ®rm with six levels was nested within national ownership as a random factor, and controls were a seven-level, within-subject variable. The dependent variable was a subject's rating of a control. After controlling for the signi®cant ®rm-within-national-ownership eect (F=1.64, p=0.000), national ownership was signi®cant (F=2.51, p=0.002). Thus, there was a signi®cant dierence in the design levels for these seven controls due to whether the ®rms had Japanese, Taiwanese or U. S. national ownership. Second, to provide more disaggregated evidence on the nature of this three-nation eect on the design of the seven controls, dierences were tested for each of the three national ownership pairings using three 2Â6Â7 MANOVAs (one MANOVA for each nation pairing) (upper right quadrant in Table 5 ). The results of these three MANOVAs revealed that the signi®cant national ownership eect in the three-nation 3Â6Â7 MANOVA was due to the Taiwanese-owned ®rms being dierent from their Taiwanese and U.S. counterparts (respectively, Japan vs Taiwan, F=3.24, p=0.004 and Japan vs U.S., F=2.83, p=0.11). Table 4 Descriptive statistics for design-preference similarity (=design level minus preferred level of each management control)
Management control
Theoretical range: minimum, maximum Third, seven 3Â6 ANOVAs were performed to test whether each of the seven controls was designed dierently for the three national ownerships (one ANOVA per control) (lower left quadrant in Table 5 ). These results indicated a signi®cant national ownership eect for structuring of activities (F=5.12, p=0.007) and participative budgeting (F=3.95, p=0.021) .
Fourth, to test for design dierences for each of the three national ownership pairings for each of the seven controls, 21 t-tests with Bonferroni contrasts were performed (lower right quadrant in Table 5 ). The results were four signi®cant dierences: the Japanese-owned ®rms' design of structuring of activities and participative budgeting dier from both the Taiwanese and U.S.-owned ®rms (p 0.01). Table 3 shows that the Japanese-owned ®rms had the lowest means for both of these controls.
Overall, we interpret these test results as providing support for H1. While the most global (3Â6Â7) MANOVA had a signi®cant national ownership eect, there was no signi®cant dierence between the U.S. and Taiwanese ®rms for any of the seven controls. And while four of the 14 between-country comparisons involving the Japanese ®rms at the individual control level were signi®cant, these were limited to two of the seven controls.
Despite our overall conclusion that the tests support H1, the four signi®cant between-country dierences involving the Japanese ®rms do leave open the nature of their MCS design policy. In the case of structuring of activities, recall from Table 2 that the prior studies had found home-country structuring in the U.S. to be equal to or higher than that in Japan. The persistence of a Japan±U.S. difference in Taiwan, in conjunction with the absence of a Taiwan±U.S. dierence, is consistent with the Japanese-owned ®rms not having modi®ed this control for transfer to Taiwan.
The ®ndings for participative budgeting, however, convey a dierent picture. Both the culturebased predictions and the preponderance of prior ®ndings had suggested that home-country use of this control would be lower in Japan than in the U.S., with Taiwan being lowest. That the Japanese-owned ®rms' mean in Taiwan is lower than the U.S.-owned ®rms' mean is consistent with the former not having modi®ed this control for transfer to Taiwan. But the puzzle that remains is why the Japanese-owned ®rms' mean was below that of the Taiwanese-owned ®rms, though this ®nding is consistent with prior ®ndings that Japanese-owned ®rms tend to adopt a more centralized and autocratic mode of management in China and SouthEast Asia than in their home-country (Smith, 1992) .
Design-preference similarity
To test H2, a four-part analysis, patterned after that for MCS design, also was performed for the similarity between MCS design and employees' preference. First, the 3Â6Â7 MANOVA indicated that, after controlling for the signi®cant ®rm-within-national-ownership eect (F=1.34, p=0.17), variation in the design-preference similarity of the seven controls for the three national ownerships was not signi®cant (F=1.54, p=0.098) (upper left quadrant in Table 6 ). Second, a 2Â6Â7 MANOVA for each of the three national ownership pairings indicated that, for these seven controls, there was a signi®cant dierence between the Japanese-and Taiwanese-owned ®rms (F=2.55, p=0.019) (upper right quadrant in Table 6 ). Third, focusing on individual controls for the three national ownerships, none of the seven 3Â6 ANOVAs comparing the three national ownerships on each control was signi®cant (lower left quadrant in Table 6 ). Fourth, 21 t-tests with-Bonferroni contrasts revealed no signi®cant dierences for any of the seven controls for any of the three national ownership pairings (lower right quadrant in Table 6 ). Overall, these results provided support for H2.
Discussion and summary
This study has used Hofstede's national culture taxonomy to derive predictions about Japanese-, Taiwanese-and U.S.-owned ®rms' design of seven management controls in their Taiwanese operations. Culture-based reasons were provided for U.S. and Taiwanese home-country designs to dier for all seven controls (Table 2) . Thus, ®nding no signi®cant U.S.±Taiwan mean dierence for both design level and design-preference similarity in their Taiwanese operations is consistent with the U.S. ®rms having adjusted their home-country controls so that the controls they used in their Taiwanese operations were similar to those of the Taiwanese-owned ®rms and their Taiwanese employees' preferences.
Dierences in home-country design for these seven controls also were predicted for Japan and Taiwan (Table 2) , and ®ve of these were found not to dier between the Taiwanese applications of the Japanese and Taiwanese companies. This ®nding is consistent with the Japanese companies also having modi®ed their home-country controls for transfer to Taiwan. But their modi®cations seemed to have been less extensive than those of the U.S. ®rms, as the Japanese ®rms' mean design levels diered signi®cantly from the Taiwanese ®rms for structuring of activities and participative budgeting. For both controls, the Japanese ®rms had the lower mean. Considering design-preference similarity, the Japanese ®rms were similar to the Taiwanese and U.S. ®rms on all of the controls despite their two MCS design dierences from the Taiwanese ®rms. In conjunction with the ®ndings for the controls' design levels, this latter result suggests that the Japanese ®rms had relied relatively more on other methods (e.g. socialization) to increase their Taiwanese employees' preference for their controls.
Thus, the results as a whole are consistent with Taiwanese national culture being an important determinant of the MCS designs used by the Japanese and U.S. ®rms in their Taiwanese operations. The (inferred) relatively greater U.S. response may be due to U.S. culture being more dierent from Taiwanese culture than is Japanese culture, so that companies from the U.S. have more to gain from modifying their home-country controls to ®t local preferences. But cultural similarity cannot explain why, relative to the Taiwanese ®rms, the Japanese ®rms' design level for participative budgeting was contrary to the predicted ordering based on Hofstede's framework. In conjunction with the prior studies' mixed results and the challenges we faced in deriving unambiguous directional dierences among the three nations' home-country controls, this unexplained ®nding suggests a need to examine whether this stream of research based on Hofstede's taxonomy has problems stemming from ineective research design and/or method, poor selection and/or measurement of variables, and/or inaccurate theory. Below, we discuss how addressing each of these non-mutually-exclusive possibilities can advance future culture-based research on management controls.
Research design/method and variable measurement
As was pointed out previously, many prior studies have inadequately controlled for the eects of contingency variables such as uncertainty, technology, organizational size, and regulations. Many have gathered data from multiple locations, and two have collected data at dierent points in time. While the current study has attempted to control for these factors, it also contains limitations of its own. Most importantly, it lacked direct measures of the Japanese and U.S. ®rms' homecountry controls, and had to rely on prior studies with dierent samples, instruments, and design limitations for inferences relating to this variable. Also, its reliance on a survey instrument limited the depth with which controls and management processes could be probed, and could have been strengthened by triangulation with other research and measurement methods (Birnberg et al., 1990) . This is especially so because cultures may dier in their sensitivity to dierent topics. For example, while prior research (e.g. Merchant, 1985 Merchant, , 1989 suggests that managers in the U.S. have no reluctance to discuss compensation and promotion issues, the Taiwanese managers that we interviewed were uniformly unwilling to address such questions (cf. footnote 6). One reason may be that members of collective cultures have a greater concern for avoiding interpersonal comparisons. A ®eld/case study method, which involves more extensive and prolonged interaction between researcher and subject than surveys, may help to build the trust needed to probe such sensitive yet important aspects of controls.
In addition, culture can aect the management process in subtle ways. For example, Birnberg and Snodgrass (1988) has found that within Japanese as compared to U.S. companies, there is a markedly greater dierence between explicit controls and implicit controls. Along the same vein, Chow et al. (1996) has found that as compared to its U.S. counterpart, a major Japanese corporation relies more on interpersonal controls. The case/ ®eld method has distinct advantages in detecting and probing below the surface of such phenomena.
Theory and variable selection
More fundamental than issues of research design and method and variable measurement is the theoretical basis of the investigation. While there is support from both prior research and the current study for the usefulness of Hofstede's cultural taxonomy, this support is not without important caveats. As we had shown earlier, Hofstede's de®nition of each cultural dimension is insuciently precise to guide consistent applications across studies, at least at the level of speci®c controls. Our application of his taxonomy also was hampered by its lack of guidance on the tradeos across multiple cultural dimensions when they exert in¯uences in opposite directions. The latter limitation can be remedied, at least in part, with empirical research which measures the strengths of dierent dimensions' eects. The former can bene®t from considering other proposed taxonomies. Instead of simply conducting yet more studies which rely indiscriminately on Hofstede's taxonomy, future research needs to test its limits and compare it to alternate ways of operationalizing or structuring national culture.
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Even if national culture is relevant to preferences for and design of controls, this would not preclude other factors from also being important. Our study has found a signi®cant ®rm-withinnational-ownership eect, indicating that, while we had attempted to control for location-related variables (e.g. regulation), technology and uncertainty (as proxied by industry) and organizational size, other (omitted) variables were present which diered between ®rms with the same national ownership. Likely variables include organizational culture, competition, and competitive strategy. For example, Merchant et al. (1995) has suggested that Taiwanese ®rms' performance evaluation and reward systems are aected by the ®rms' market focus and stage of development. Dent (1996) has argued that dierences in the global economy (e.g. global competition, trade barriers, regulations) and global strategy (e.g. product standardization, global marketing, world-scale and world-class eciencies, cross-product subsidization for market penetration) have had signi®cant eects on the design of organization and management control systems.
An implication of this line of argument is that management controls are determined by a national culture-by-competition interaction. Consistent with this view, Firth (1996) has reported that the degree to which Chinese ®rms adopt their foreign partner's management accounting systems is positively associated with the extent of their market competition. Modeling the linkages among national culture, competition and management controls will not be easy and research with this focus must be informed by a large set of interdisciplinary literatures. One way to start is to select controls that vary by their internal vs external orientation, and test the relative impacts of national culture and other factors (e.g. national/ global competition, technology) on their design and preference.
Ultimately, factors like national culture, competition and the environment aect MCS design because they aect the perceived costs and bene®ts of alternate designs. When a ®rm operates across numerous national boundaries, comparability across organizational sub-units for planning and control is another factor that can increase the perceived costs of culture-based MCS tailoring. An interesting example of convergent organizational design and management systems is provided by Asea Brown Boveri which has a common management structure and systems for control, information, and rewards which are used throughout its world-wide operations to promote information sharing and coordination (Simons, 1992a,b; Simons & Bartlett, 1992) . To the extent that a common global control system is consistent (or, conversely, inconsistent) with local employees' culture-based preferences, it should aect such outcome variables as job eort, stress, performance, satisfaction, and turnover intentions. Extending the scope of investigation to include these other variables and tradeos can produce a more complete understanding of the importance of national culture in MCS design and preference.
Finally, concurrent with ®rms modifying their MCS and engaging in socialization activities to be consistent with or in¯uence employees' culturebased preferences, individuals also may adjust to the new realities of global competition. Thus, for example, people from individualistic cultures like the U.S. may voluntarily adopt more team-oriented practices when such design is demanded by the global environment (Andreoni, 1988; Dawes & Thaler, 1988; Mansbridge, 1990; Awasthi et al., 1996) . Conversely, people from collectivist cultures like Japan and Taiwan may internalize more individualistic values as they increasingly engage in exchange with Western nations (Wang, 1994; Yang, 1996) . Such cultural shifts do not need to occur for the population as a whole to impact MCS design. For example, as long as a sucient pool of local residents in Taiwan has been educated or worked in the U.S. or Japan, U.S. or Japanese companies can focus on hiring local employees who identify with their homecountry cultures and directly transfer their home-country MCSs to Taiwan (Merchant et al., 1995) .
In summary, understanding where and how national culture is important to MCS design and preference is both important and highly challenging. While the current study and prior research have contributed useful insights into the topic, much more remains to be investigated. Meaningful advances will require a coordinated research strategy which attends to theory development, research design and variable measurement, and a depth of inquiry which goes beyond developing and testing surface-or generic-level models.
F. Koo Cultural and Educational Foundation, and the Wang/CIBER Center.
(e) Acts of nature (e.g. ®res, earthquakes, typhoons,¯oods). (7) Performance-contingent ®nancial rewards
(1) The extent to which your compensation contract clearly speci®es how your compensation is related to your unit's performance relative to your unit's budget. (2) The extent to which your ®nancial rewards increase as your unit increasingly outperforms your unit's budget. (3) The extent to which managers whose units' performance relative to their budgets are among the top 25% are given larger ®nancial rewards than those given to unit managers among the bottom 25%. (4) The percentage of your total annual compensation typically coming from a pre-set salary as opposed to a bonus based on your unit's performance relative to your unit's budget.
